The recent general election in Japan resulted in a historic landslide victory for the Liberal Democratic Party. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the snap election in a bid to strengthen her majority in the House of Representatives, the powerful lower house of the Diet. The landslide gave the LDP 316 out of 465 seats, giving the LDP a t
¾ß¸¶Å俬Ÿ wo-thirds supermajority in its own right for the first time in history. This allows the party to override an upper-house veto of a bill. The Japan Innovation Party, the coalition partner since late 20
¸±°ÔÀÓ¹Ù´ÙÀ̾߱â 25, won 36 seats, giving the coalition 352 seats.
The landslide decimated the opposition. The Centrist Reform Alliance, formed from a merger of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan a
¹Ù´ÙÀ̾߱â°ÔÀÓ2 nd former LDP partner Komeito, lost 123 seats. The Communist Party, which emerged as a third force from the 1970s to 1990s, won only four seats, its worst electoral showing since the 1960 election. Th
¸±°ÔÀÓ»çÀÌÆ® e progressive Reiwa Shinsengumi Party, meanwhile, dropped from eight seats to one, giving left-wing parties a total of five seats. If the CRA is included, then center-left parties hold only 54 seats i
¹Ù´ÙÀ̾߱â¿À¶ô½Ç n the Diet.
Beyond the LDP-JIP coalition, center-right and right-wing parties won 44 seats, giving the entire center-right bloc 396 seats or 85 percent of the lower house. The controversial far-right performed well, jumping from two to 15 seats. Team Mirai, a new antiestablishment centrist reform party, won 11 seats, a strong showing for a new party. The party rejects traditional right-left labels but has said it will cooperate with the majority on specific issues.
What does this mean for Japanese politics and foreign policy? First, the election results represent a clear turn to the right. The size of the majority means that the LDP will be able to govern at will for at least the next four years. The coalition with the Japan Innovation Party will most likely endure, but if it collapses, the LDP would still maintain a two-thirds majority. No party in the postwar era has found itself in such a powerful position.
In a parliamentary system like Japan, an overwhelming majority usually emboldens the ruling party to pursue its political agenda. Expect the Takaichi-led LDP to focus on a ¡°strong-Japan¡± agenda, part of which involves strengthening Japan¡¯s military power. Fear of a rising China and uncertainty regarding the US security umbrella ensure that the country will continue to invest in its military.
Japan reached 2 percent of gross domestic product in military spending in 2025 and climbed to 7th place worldwide, according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index. With a supermajority, Takaichi may push for further increases soon, say, to 2.6 percent of GDP, the current level of South Korea, or perhaps eventually reaching the 3.3 percent level of the US.
As a protege of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Takaichi wants to amend the constitution so that Japan can become a ¡°normal country¡± with a full-fledged military that goes beyond the current self-defense limitations.
To do so, a constitutional revision must pass both houses of the Diet with a two-thirds majority and then receive a simple majority in a national referendum. At present, this is questionable because the LDP coalition and other sympathetic parties have slightly over 160 seats in the upper house, which falls short of the two-thirds needed. If she can¡¯t find a few more votes, she will most likely wait until the next upper house election in 2028, in which half of the members will stand for election. A strong showing could give the ruling coalition enough votes to pass an amendment comfortably. A weak showing, however, could derail the effort.
For South Korea, the prospect of an increasingly powerful Japan is unsettling, but it also presents an opportunity. The 2026 Global Firepower Index ranks South Korea as the 5th most powerful military in the world, behind India but above France. Like Japan, the country is increasing its military investment and is set to remain a formidable power. The two countries share similar concerns regarding China and the US commitment, which creates opportunities to deepen cooperation.
Cooperation may become easier as the anti-Japanese left in South Korea ages. As in Japan, the core support for left-wing politics in South Korea comes from aging political activist generations. Younger generations perceive these aging activists as old and out of touch. Young generations grew up in a different world and want new ideas and fresh faces, not left-wing greatest hits. Expect talk of cooperation to grow in the 2030s and beyond.
Robert J. Fouser
Robert J. Fouser, a former associate professor of Korean language education at Seoul National University, writes on Korea from Providence, Rhode Island. He can be reached at robertjfouser@gmail.com. The views expressed here are the writer¡¯s own. ? Ed.